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Abstract 
In the case of Bosnian War (1992-1995), International Participation has just maintained interethnic peace with limited success. 
Peace-keeping strategies implemented without consensus subsequently set up an environment in which ethnic cleansings 
transformed into genocide in UN “ Safe Areas”. According to World Bank’s reports; following the end of military conflict late 
1995, of a pre-war population of 4.4 million, an estimated 250,000 people had lost their lives or were considered missing, 200,000 
to 400,000 people had been wounded, and an estimated 2.5 million people, more than half the population, either left the country as 
refugees or were internally displaced (The World Bank Report, 2004).  Despite what has happened during the turmoil, the worst 
happened in Srebrenica as one of UN Security Zone which was protected by Dutch soldiers. Still it is unknown how many people 
had lost their lives in Srebrenica. According to Human Right Watch Reports, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was systematically planned 
and implemented by Serbian irregulars. In this article, it is aimed to illustrate the negative effects of dissolving interethnic peace in 
Bosnia. The case of Bosnian interethnic war has been examined from security matter to genocide. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Following the end of the Cold War, economic and politic conditions in Yugoslavia deteriorated interethnic security 
and peace among ‘neighbors’. Ethnic and religious roots of the conflict during Tito’s Yugoslavia were embedding for 
long time till Tito’s death. However, in the case of Bosnian and Kosovo tragedies, ethnic and religious causes of the 
conflict did stand in the forefront. Apart from historical problems, economic causes of the conflict have not been yet 
examined in details. Colleagues have been already writing articles referring initially to both ethnic and religious roots 
of the conflict. Moreover, extensive studies and researches published in journals address causes of the conflict to 
genocide in terms of ethnicity rather than timing of International Military Intervention. International scholars also paid 
less attention to the post-conflict peace and security including the ways of sustaining long term security by creating 
common interest among conflicting parties in the Balkans. During the collapse of interethnic peace in Yugoslavia, the 
lack of economic interest, imbalanced prosperities of the constituent states within Confederation, problems with 
common budgeting system, malfunction of fiscal institutions were at the core of rapid economic deterioration.  Paul 
Collier in his article suggests economic causes of a civil war/conflict might stem from greed and grievance. The first 
stage of interethnic conflict according to him is extreme rebellions and riots (Collier, 1999: 16). Collier in his article 
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insists that the main impetus behind rebellions is based on resource allocation and capturing resources extra-legally. 
Overnight the more prosperous northern republics of Slovenia and Croatia were pitted against the less wealthy 
southern states. The northerners resented having to pay for development of the more backward southerners (Baffin, 
1996:101) 
 
In the Balkans sustaining long term interethnic security is to be traced to a number of complex factors. Following the 
end of turmoil in the Balkans, the last decade reveals the importance of sustaining interethnic security among 
conflicting parties by maintaining common economic interest rather than solitary military measures. On the other 
hand, importance of deterrence power of military presence should not be neglected in the Balkans. Military measures 
and strategies are vital parts of keeping peace and security in post- conflict environment. Bosnian and Kosovo 
tragedies were ended by international solidarity and humanitarian intervention. However, maintaining security in the 
conflicting areas by belated military strategies was ageing and tiring for victims of the war. Belated arrival of strong 
military operations, imposing economic and arms embargo provoked genocide (Holbrooke, 1998; Yenigün, Hacıoğlu, 
2004:186; Hacıoğlu, 2008:189-210). However, belated Military measures were vital instruments to end tragedies but 
could not make sure of sustaining long term peace and security as conflicting parties still debating on territorial issues, 
displaced people, use of economic resources, and judgment of war fugitives. Hence, international community must 
contribute and facilitate initially peace progress by mediating unresolved issues and maintaining common interest 
among conflicting parties. Paul Collier in this issue stresses economic policy priorities in post-conflict societies. 
According to him, in order to sustain long term security in post conflict environment, conflicting parties need to 
reduce the underlying risks of conflict involving the same policies which are appropriate in conflict prevention, such 
as diversification and poverty reduction( Collier, 1999: 13) Common interest also composes of both social and 
economic agendas including sustaining improvement in health, education and culture, righteous judgment of fugitives, 
compensating war crimes, functionalizing open market principles, encouraging FDIs, mediating territorial disputes 
and sustaining transparency.  
2. Interethnic Peace, Security and Conflict in Bosnia  
Understanding the concept of security and its theoretical frame is necessary before evaluating the past and future 
conditions affecting interethnic peace in the Balkans.  The traditional security paradigm in international relations is the 
main element of realist school in which state structure is prior focus point. During the Cold War, main actors- super 
powers- enhanced security of their countries attaching security of nation to a balance of power condition among other 
dominant states. Therefore sovereignty of nation-state is attached to military power and sustaining security by military 
measures covering influence areas at external peripheries. During the post Cold War period, globalization has changed 
evolution of this theorem. The latest developments in internet and communication technologies crystallized 
globalization process in which new security paradigm emerged. International terrorism, self-determination and 
humanitarian intervention were deliberately linked to security questions. As well as emerging new security 
architecture following the collapse of Soviet Union, internet and communication technologies today specifies 
globalization process which has already marked significantly (Yılmaz, 2007: 1)  
The concept of Security must be evaluated considering two different dimensions: National Security and Interethnic 
Security.  National Security is vital for a nation state which is clearly unified and one dominant nation is sovereign 
enhancing minorities such as Turkey, Greece and Germany. (2) Interethnic Security is vital for collective 
constitutional system in which constituent states compose of multiethnic groups and diversities such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Globalization in the first dimension might be challenging for national security as Yılmaz advocates 
(Yılmaz, 2007: 1-15). According to him, Globalization has its influences on security as (Yılmaz, 2007: 3; Yılmaz, 
2006: 97-98); 
 (1) Appearances of International and transnational structures defects the national sovereignty… (2) 
Global economic integration limits the national control over economy and the central governments, 
and weakens the state. (3) as economy emerges as the most important engine of national power, 
international economic actors including IMF, NGOs are the most important factors defining the 
parameters of development of national economy. (4) Transnational social and religious activities 
challenge the national security. (5)Global communication and transportation make it difficult to have 
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control over nation state boundaries. (6) National Union is under threat of ethnic and religious 
diversity, and self-determination.  
Apart from the negative effects of Globalization process on National Security, the Civil war in Yugoslavia examined 
the boundaries of sovereignty and the ways of sustaining security.  Global communication and effects of independent 
media groups, NGOs, social pressure groups urged international community to consider seriously what has been 
happening in Bosnia and Kosovo. Hence, International participation intervened into conflict, kept the peace, 
maintained and sustained security among conflicting parties by military measures. In the contrary, the prevalence of 
humanitarian intervention brought new questions on issue of sovereignty of a nation state and sustaining security. 
Humanitarian intervention is one of the primary international security problems of today (Fixdal and Smith, 1998: 
283). Despite the challenging controversies, conditions of post-conflict environment could not be managed by global 
actors and NGOs. According to Crisis Prevention and Recovery Report, Post- Conflict Economic Recovery requires 
not only sustained economic growth, but also reducing the risk of conflict recurring. Therefore sustainable growth 
must be accompanied by employment expansion (UN, 2008: 24). However, official unemployment rate in BH 
throughout the past decade was exceeding 40 percent. World Bank Office in Bosnia announced that social expenditure 
in BiH, one of the highest in Europe as percentage of GDP, reaches only 30 percent of those most in need in BiH, one 
of the lowest rates in Europe(http://go.worldbank.org/54PCSU2E90). According to Report it is critical to sustain 
recovery efforts primarily promoting policies that attract private sector investment as well as the return of skilled 
workers (UN, 2008: 24). 
Recently, in the Balkans interethnic peace sustained by international participation is prone to disappear as security 
problems are associated with economic development progress of new emerging states at region, new collective 
presidency and power sharing system, global economic crisis, higher unemployment rates, deficiencies in budgeting 
system. Moreover, intensive political burdens within power sharing system melt down security policies and escalated 
ancient hatreds especially following Kosovo’s independence in 2008 (Hacıoğlu, 2008: 189-195).    
2.1.The Collapse of Interethnic Peace and Security in the Former Yugoslavia 
Interethnic peace and security in the Balkans always became challenging issue as stability maintained by hegemonic 
powers disappeared during power shifts (Hagen, 1999: 57-64). Scholars pointed out that instability stems from the 
security gaps traced to changes in power shifts (Malcolm; 1994). … BiH must surely be the ‘powder-keg’ of the 
Balkans. Traditionally, this label can be attributed because the republic sat on the fault-line between the Christian 
empires of Central Europe and the Ottoman Empire (Griffiths, 1993: 52).  
Griffiths in this argument should have attributed Bosnia and Herzegovina as the country of peace and tolerance since 
15th century to 18th during Ottoman Rule. Only between 16th and 17th centuries, BiH contributed Ottoman State 
system with more than 9 Vezir-i Azams and countless high rank officers.   Following nationalism movements in 
Europe, ethic groups in the Balkans had revolted weakening the interethnic security within Ottoman State. Habsburgs 
invaded Bosnia in 1878 and had supremacy until 1908. However, following years Orthodox Russian backed- Serbs 
revolted against Ottomans and invaded Kosovo during 1912 Balkans War and declared independency after a short 
time. Hagen and Malcolm stress that during power shifts from Ottomans to Habsburgs and from Habsburgs to the 
Kingdom of Serbia, countless Croatians, Serbians and Bosnian Muslims were massacred (Hagen 1999:57- 60; 
Malcolm 1994). These massacres had cultivated the ancient hatreds among Serbs and Croatians significantly. 
European historians accept at least 500.000 people were killed during Utasha’s slaughter (Baffin, 1996: 99) 
“From the beginning of the post-1918 nation, violence permeated politics. In 1928 Serb extremists assassinated Stefan 
Radio, Croatian leader of the powerful Peasant Party, in the parliamentary chamber and bloody riots erupted all over 
Croatia. The following year the desperate King Alexander declared a royal dictatorship and tried to replace Serbian 
and Croatian nationalism with patriotic country of ‘Yugoslavia’.  …. Utasha movement in 1934 pioneered by Ante 
Pavic backed by Mussolini in Italy and the new Nazi Party in Germany assassinated King Alexander.  … After the 
German - Italian invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941, Hitler and his Nazi ssociates used he hatreds of the Balkan people to 
divide then. He offered the Croatians their independence and installed Ante Pavic as puppet ruler. With the Nazi’s 
blessing, Pavic set out to ‘purify’ his new nation; fifty years later this bestial actively would be called ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ (Baffin, 1996: 99)” 
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Malcolm also argues that Serbian hatred and atrocity against Bosnian Muslims derives from Islamization of Bosnian- 
Bogomils and termination of Serb Army during The Kosovo War of 1389 (Malcolm, 1994 ).  
 2.1.1.Pre-conflict security Strategy: Coercion Vs. Constitutional Rights  
Who secured best among conflicting groups in short time? How to secure interethnic peace? The answer is clear 
behind another question! Did you see any interethnic groups in Yugoslavia? Tito was successful liberating Yugoslavia 
and creating one single identity until his death. The tools which he had used to unify different ethnic groups were 
initially coercions and finally constitutional privileges given to constituent states. 
During WWII, UK and Russian backed Josip Broz Tito with his partisans pioneered liberation movement ending 
Nazi’s Occupation of Yugoslavia. Tito declared himself as Marshal in 1945 with all respect of all ethnic groups.  
Interethnic peace during Tito’s ruling had been once more sustained among conflicting parties but in one identity of 
Yugoslavians. Meanwhile, religious and ethnic based differences were coerced during Tito’s time. Boy’s Sunnet 
tradition of Bosnian Muslims working state departments was forbidden. Sometimes, Muslims were forced to eat pork. 
Religious practices were also urged to do behind back doors. After a short time, Yugoslavia’s foreign policy became 
friendly with Islamic countries in order to gain from trade petroleum commodities (Malcolm, 1994).   Then, 
Relaxation of forbidden Islamic practices contributed into obedience of Bosnians to Yugoslavia. In fact, the split of 
Yugoslavia’s foreign policies from the orbit of Soviet Union seals Yugoslavia’s future much closer to Europe. Tito 
even broke away from Moscow’s domination and in 1953 he introduced a ‘third path’ between Stalinism and Western 
imperialism (Baffin, 1996: 99-100) 
2.2.2. Ancient Hatret 
As mentioned before, security during Tito’s Yugoslavia was sustained mainly by coercions on historical, ethnic and 
religious differences. In addition to this, wealthy Slovenia and Croatia were urged to pay more taxes and allocate 
resources to common economic system of Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, collective leadership and constitutional rights 
were given to states within Yugoslavia in 1974. Overnight the more prosperous northern republics of Slovenia and 
Croatia were pitted against the less wealthy southern states. The northerners resented having to pay for development of 
the more backward southerners (Baffin, 1996:101) Resource allocation and heavy taxation of export commodities 
sparked the nations seceded. As I attributed to Collier’s article in the beginning, the main impetus behind rebellions is 
based on resource allocation and capturing resources extra-legally. According to Collier, Successful rebel 
organizations place considerable emphasis upon good public relations with the international community (Collier: 
1999:1) Croatia and Slovenia were economically prosperous and had strong economic ties with European countries in 
terms of trade and tourism.  
Dissolving interethnic peace in Yugoslavia was not only stemming from ancient atrocities, but also role of TVs and 
newspapers, novels in literature, revival of ancient stories, nationalist propaganda led by academicians in Serbia, 
economic devastation and so on. Rational-choice theorists, motivated by the Yugoslav wars, have focused on ethnic 
warfare, but they have not always felt obliged to offer a theory of ethnic conflict in general. For them ethnic war is 
produced by the sense of insecurity that emerges when an actor is unsure of the intentions of another actor and the two 
are already mutually hostile(Horowitz, 1998). After Tito’s death in 1980, mistrust and embedded ancient hatred took 
place once more in TVs (Peterson, 1996). Old stories and nationalist expressions in Serbian and Croatian literatures 
(Sells: 1998: 23-43) were intensified following devastation of economy (Ramet, 1996: 44) 
Besides the decline in production in 1990, unemployment rate more than %15, inflation rate more than %125, foreign 
debt more than 20 billion $, budget deficits level approximately 3 billion $, decline in foreign currency levels from 6,5 
Billion to 3,6 billion $ devastated the country wide economy( Ramet, 1996: 44-48). Here we should note that before 
the collapse of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbian domination over country’s collective presidency and 
allocation of resources challenged the constituent states of Yugoslavia to secede.  
3. Brutality and Genocide in Bosnian War 
The basics of interethnic peace in the Balkans rely on interethnic security which can be sustained by implementing 
economic and social measures. Common social and economic interests must be composed of all ethnic groups without 
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coercion. Tito’s charismatic leadership and fame after World War II gained the respects of fractious groups but not 
excluded coercive policies among them. As I mentioned before, interethnic security was sustained by initially coercion 
and finally constitutional rights given to states within Yugoslavia during Tito’s time. As expected, after the death of 
Tito in 1980, effective power mover at an ever more raped rate from the federal centre to regional party leader, and as 
the economy began to decline, regional leaders started to take an interest in local ethnic problems an in promoting 
division between the constituent nations (Griffiths, 1993: 41). Origins of civil war are broadly consistent with an 
economic motivation and with grievance (Collier, 1999:2).  
After Slobodan Milosevic became the leading political figure in Serbia and the former Yugoslavia, the high degree of 
autonomy Kosovo had been granted in 1974 was revoked then security in Kosova and in other parts of Yugoslavia 
became the real matter for civilians. .. the constitution prompted the development of a sense of real grievance among 
Serbians that was not addressed effectively until Milosevic rose to power( Griffiths, 1993:41) After a while the 
province was brought under Belgrade's direct control in March 1989. The move was followed by the mass sackings of 
Kosovo Albanians from state-run companies and institutions, including the police, schools and Pristina University. 
Others who were not fired left their jobs in sympathy. The Kosovo Albanian media was suppressed and education in 
the Albanian language was suspended, to be restored in 1994(www.setimes.com). Based on Slobodan Milosevic’s 
hostile policies, Bosnian Muslims, Kosovo Albanians and other ethnic groups became the victims at streets. Serbian 
national hatred against Bosnian Muslims and Catholic Croatians caused ethnic distortion and fed disharmony among 
Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian neighbors. Milosevic’s rise to power prompted a further resurgence of nationalist 
feeling among Serbs and equally nationalist feelings in Slovenia and Croatia (Griffiths, 1993: 41-42). In 1989, 
Slovenia introduced a new constitution guaranteed the right to secede from Serb dominated Yugoslavia. The 
constitution caused demonstrations in Serbia.  In 1990, Slovene Communist Party abolished itself and the Slovenian 
National Assembly issued a declaration of sovereignty (Griffiths, 1993: 42). In 1990 Serb minority in the Croat city of 
Knin also decided to hold a referendum which turned into armed insurrection. Yugoslav turmoil and security of ethnic 
groups became devastated. Armed conflict could not be prevented as European Community considered the crisis as 
Yugoslavia’s internal crisis.   
Apart from EC’s uninterested approach to Yugoslavia’s internal security manner, the Community surprisingly paid 
more attention to Slovenian and Croatian declaration of independence rather than BiH. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
population is a mix of Bosniks ( 43 per cent), Croatians( 17 per cent)  and Serbians( 32 per cent). By the elections of 
1990 in Bosnia, Bosniaks had the largest share of seats in the National Assembly while Croatians and Serbs were 
confronting each other on ethnic issues. Meanwhile, Bosnian side within federation determined her policy on 
democratic tradition declaring self- disarmament and announced that there ware no plans to secede.  However, Serbian 
ethnic group of Bosnia had been heavily armed. Self- Disarmament of Bosnians changed the balance power within 
former Yugoslavia while Cetnics- Serbian irregulars- were being supported by JNA (Yugoslavian Army).  
Once more, security within state was prone to interwar as escalating demands of minorities over Bosnian governance.  
The Muslims had no desire to live in a ‘Greater Serbia’, a fate that seemed inevitable as Serbia secured control of 
territory across Croatia in autumn 1991; likewise they had no real wish to be subject to the political pressure that 
would come from an alliance with Croatia, which had as much interest tin taking a slice of Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
it did of making strategic deals against Serbia (Griffiths, 1993: 53).  After declaring independency, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina entered into turmoil and chaos. Serbia backed Serb Cetniks( Irregular Serbian paramilitary group) 
systematically stepped into rapes and ethnic cleansings between Bosnian terrains. According to International Court of 
Justice’s decision in April, 2007, the events in Bosnia were defined as genocide. However, Serbia’s acquittal was 
decided by Court, although Serbia provided ammunitions for Cetniks (Hacıoğlu, 2008:205).   
According to World Bank’s reports; following the end of military conflict late 1995, of a pre-war population of 4.4 
million, an estimated 250,000 people had lost their lives or were considered missing, 200,000 to 400,000 people had 
been wounded, and an estimated 2.5 million people, more than half the population, either left the country as refugees 
or were internally displaced (The World Bank Report, 2004).  Despite what has happened during the turmoil, the 
worst happened in Srebrenica as one of UN Security Zone which was protected by Dutch soldiers. Still it is unknown 
how many people had lost their lives in Srebrenica. According to Human Right Watch Reports, ethnic cleansing in 
Bosnia was systematically planned and implemented by Serbian irregulars (A Helsinki Watch Report: Human Rights 
Watch, 1992; 1993). What has happened at the core of Central Europe is never to be forgotten. The things happened in 
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Sava River, Brcko, Zepze, Tuzla, Zenica, Bihac and Sarajevo and especially in Srebrenica stain peace and 
international justice (Hacıoğlu, 2009: 2006). Thousands of Muslims in Srebrenica were massacred without any mercy 
in warehouses, soccer fields and terrains ( Holbrooke, 1998:69) 
4. Peace-Keeping and Stabilization in the Bosnian War 
In the case of Yugoslavia’s break-up, security matter turned into genocide within Bosnia and Kosovo territories. 
Problems associated with timing and scale of UNSEC’s peacekeeping measures in Bosnia, in fact, encouraged Serbian 
authorities to pursue aggression. Aggressions in Bosnia especially within safety areas turned into genocide . Hence, 
belated peacekeeping measures were not effective as peacekeeping forces could not have been keeping themselves 
secured. Apart from the failure of UN’s peacekeeping strategy, NATO military forces led by US succeeded to 
intervene into conflict demonstrating desire and ambitious. Second and third phase of intervention was peace 
stabilization and implementation. However, Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) is not successful to sustain long term peace. 
Still politic and economic contradictions between constituent states RS and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
devastating the functionality of Bosnian State. The Accord, in this way, is a premature agreement for stabilizing 
interethnic peace and security.    
If the Balkans is to be considered the ‘powder-keg’ of Europe, then Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) must surely be the 
‘powder keg’ of the Balkans (Griffiths, 1993:52). Despite the turmoil intensified at the core of European security and 
influence zone, European Community was not desirous to manage the conflict with full operation. Moreover, EC was 
not also capable to put an end to one-side Serbian dominated interwar with military intervention. While both the 
United States and the European Union initially viewed the Balkan wars as a European problem, the Europeans chose 
not to take a strong stand, restricting themselves to dispatching U.N. “Peacekeepers” to a country where there was no 
peace to keep, and withholding from them the means and the authority to stop the fighting (Holbrooke, 1998: xv). 
Meanwhile, debates on which military and economic measures should be taken by International Community among 
UN, NATO, EC members were endless and sparked Serbian authorities to pursue the aggression. The principal 
performers in the tragedy were not even considering peace and UN, NATO and US intelligence about their intentions 
seemed strangely limited (Baffin 1996:105)  
Why does the world notice and intervene in crisis while paying less attention to others? Answer is not simple. 
Countless facts behind belated military intervention were available. Understanding timing of Humanitarian 
Intervention begins enumerating some factors as followings(i)Both the United States and members of UNSEC initially 
viewed the Balkan wars as a European problem, (ii) Dissidences among EC members,(iii), Lack of institutions within 
EU to support preventive diplomacy,(iv) The contradictions of the UNSEC members, (iv) Lack of EU’s economic 
interest with Bosnia, (v) Lack of EU’s capacity to use enforcement operations (vi) Attitude of crisis as being part of 
Yugoslavia’s internal problem, (vii) Ongoing and ageing debates on the nature of Humanitarian Intervention, (viii) 
UNSEC’s approach traced to possible success of economic sanctions and arms ambargo. (ix) Complexity of the Issue 
as Multiethnic conflict, (x) Lack of knowledge for background, context and dynamics of the conflict, (xi)EU’s 
Attitude of diplomatic deterrence is enough to sustain peace without use of armies, (xii)EU’s Attitude of Third party 
mediation could prevent aggression, (xiii) The break-up of Yugoslavia and violence were neither sudden nor 
unpredictable. EU and UNSEC were not fully prepared for Intervention. 
4.1. Is only Peacekeeping Efforts by military measures in conflicting areas enough to secure and maintain peace? 
The answer is not simple while other domestic and external factors affecting the nature of conflict. In some cases, 
economic sanctions are useful and peaceful tools of deterrence diplomacy rather than rapid military intervention 
strategies. However, the conflict in Bosnia was deeper and brutal as well as economic sanctions were on way to 
warring parties. Because of the scale and scope of the conflict in Bosnia, humanitarian intervention must have been 
faster to keep and maintain peace. It could not have been successfully implemented because of timing and lack of 
willingness of International Community. … it is the question of will, or lack of it, which has been a central feature of 
criticisms of United Nations’s UN Action in Bosnia( Gow 1997;  Fixdal and Smith, 1998: 284) Hundreds and 
thousands of civilians lost their lives. Thousands of them were wounded. Countless children who lost their families 
were mentally affected. The devastation and human suffering of the war were on a scale not seen in Europe since 
World War II( The World Bank: BiH, 2004). As Fixdal and Smith criticize willingness of UN’s Action in war, it can 
be extended to the International Community’s role.  
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Old Security Strategy preventing deadly conflicts consists of preventive diplomacy, the neutralization, peaceful 
settlement of conflicts. Unilateral interventions by major powers have declined, through not entirely disappeared, and 
they have been replaced by the UN and increasingly, NATO interventions (Vayrynen, 1990:2)  
4.2 Peacekeeping and Security in Interethnic Conflict 
At the beginning of conflict in Bosnia, international community were far from agreement and did not know why it was 
necessary to intervene into conflict as it was seen as an internal matter of Yugoslavia. However, expectations of 
international societies became higher as turmoil escalated and deepened. Particularly, timing of International 
Intervention was criticized comparing the effective collective response to the Gulf crisis.   
With the collapse of preventive diplomacy including economic and arms embargo, it was not inevitable to utilize 
military instruments for the purposes of deterrence and territorial control. Interethnic security and peace which 
devastated in Bosnia, was then object to peace restoration strategies including peace-making and keeping. In the case 
of of the UN deployment in Bosnia, the use of force was authorized to ensure the delivery of aid and to deter attacks 
against “safe areas” (Turkovic, 1996: 20). As Serbian aggression could not be controlled, UN’s deployment in Bosnia 
was not enough to implement the task of securing “safe areas”.  According to Chapter VII (SCR 770) resolution which 
was adopted by UN Security Council, “member states were responsible to act nationally or through regional 
organizations to take all measures necessary to facilitate, in coordination with the UN, the delivery of humanitarian 
aid, following its unprecedented step of renewing UNPROFOR’s mandate under Chapter VII to ensure the security of 
UNPROFOR” and to “ensure its freedom of movement for all its missions (SCR 815)”. UNPROFOR was authorized 
and responsible for peacekeeping and drawing a thin blue line determining the Serb-held areas.  UNPROFOR was 
initially responsible to keep peace and maintain security in UN Safety Zones: these were Bihac, Tuzla, Zepze, 
Gorazde, Sarajevo and Srebrenica. The task of UNPROFOR was defined in Chapter VII resolution and associated 
with protecting safe areas (SCR 819-24-36-44). UNPROFOR was also authorized to enforce ‘no-fly-zone’ (SCR 816). 
4.3 Massacres in Safety Areas 
UNPROFOR had more than 10.000 troops in the beginning. On 12 February 1992 UN Security council Resolution 
743 endorsed a proposal to send extra peacekeeping forces deployed. New task was to sustain ceasefire, begin 
disarming the Serbian militias and to check the withdrawal of the JNA in Sarajevo, Bosnia. However, UNPROFOR 
was not able to secure its own security as carrying out security tasks for “Safe Areas”.  UNPROFOR deployed in 
Sarajevo was only witnessing how civilians were being brutally targeted. (Hacioglu, 2008: Documentary Film). Serb 
tanks guns and artillery positioned on heights around the city kept up a relentless fire and snipers at closer range 
picked off pedestrians, car drivers and tram passengers. People were dying as they queued for bread; children were 
slaughtered as they played in the parks. The Serbs showed no mercy to the residents of Sarajevo. A Seven-year-old 
boy, Nermin Divocic, was hit in the face by a sniper’s bullet in the middle of Sarajevo while holding his mother’s 
hand as they ran past a UN armored personnel carrier. The sniper then shot Nermin’s mother in the stomoach so she 
would not die immediately but would watch her son die first. The most horrific event of the period occurred on 12 
February 1994 when a mortal shell burst in Sarajevo’s central market, killing 68 people. Seeing the carnage on 
television, the American and European leaders issued an ultimatum to the Serbs:  Stop shelling Sarajevo. Pull back all 
guns, heavy mortars and tanks 30 kilometers from the capital and put them under UN control (Baffin, 1996: 103). 
Issuing ultimatum just encouraged the Serbs to pursue aggression as it has not been suggesting ground troops with 
heavy weapons would have been put into Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia. Ratko Miladic carried out the biggest 
genocide, which was not seen in Europe since World War II. The extent of the massacres held in Gorozde, Zepa and 
especially Srebrenica still cannot be identified .  Why the extent of massacres carried out within “safety areas” was 
larger at scale and scope? 
UN Safety area of Srebrenica was being controlled by Dutch peace-keepers as more than 500 Bosnian Serb Soldiers 
under the command of General Ratko Mladic were besieging the town. Dutch soldiers without any use of bullets gave 
up the control of town, where many women repeatedly raped and then loaded on to trucks with children never seen 
again; men put into hangars and slaughtered in soccer fields with only use of knifes; and some of those buried in mass 
graves. Thousands of Muslims in Srebrenica were massacred without any mercy in warehouses, soccer fields and 
terrains (Holbrooke, 1998:69). In fact, I spent long hours unsuccessfully trying to find a way to stop the tragey in 
Srebrenizca and Zepa. My recommendation- to use airpower against the Bosnian Serbs in other parts of the country, as 
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well as Srebrenca- had been rejected by the Western European nations that had troops at risk in Bosnia, an by the 
Pentagon. On the July, the same day the Serbs began killing Muslims systematcally in the soccer stadium( Holbrooke, 
1998: 70) 
In 04 April 2006, the Ministy of Interior honored “Brave!” Dutch soldiers by Golden Medal with ceremony for their 
“eminent services” held in Srebrenica during Bosnian War. In April, 2007, one year later, International Court of 
Justice announced court’s decision on the events in Bosnia. Events were defined clearly as genocide. However, 
Serbia’s acquittal was also decided by Court, apart from Serbia provided ammunitions for Cetniks (Hacıoğlu, 
2008:205). The extent of massacres carried out within “safety areas” was larger at scale and scope because of belated 
military intervention and the lack of willingness of International Community to intervene into conflict. On the other 
hand, the lack of common decision, and available dissidences among EU members, and UNSEC members prevented 
to implement rapid reaction moves.   
4.4. Humanitarian Intervention: Implementation of Security 
As war devastated the social life within Bosnian territory, UNPROFOR was not able to sustain security in “safety 
areas”. Meanwhile, the UN arms embargo on conflicting parties prevented only Bosnian Muslims’ efforts to defend 
home security. In addition to the arms embargo, UNPROFOR commanders were unconcerned and far away from 
taking responsibility as seen in Srebrenica.  As UNSEC and EU stood unconcerned and expected some gains from 
negotiating table only, US took the responsibility during President Clinton’s administration. UNPROFOR had been so 
thoroughly humiliated by mid-December 1994 that President Clinton offered to send 25.000 American troops to 
extract peacekeeping from Bosnia ( Baffin, 1996: 107). Apart from debates were endless for taking responsibility, the 
Serbs were advancing and repeating performance in the mid of 1995. The Serbs were murdering and raping. The last 
shelling of a marketplace in Sarajevo killing more than 35 people, sparked decision makers to functionalize operation 
of NATO.  On 20 August 1995  NATO began Operation Deny Flight driving Serb artillery out of Sarajevo and 
sustained security. NATO air operations in the former Yugoslavia began long before the attacks of 30 August 1995. 
The first involvement was Operaton Maritime Monitor, on 16 July 1992, followed by Sky Monitor on October 1992. 
Deny Flight itself began 12 April 1995. 5 times offensive air operatons were authorized under the dual key UN/ NATo 
systems(Baffin, 1996: 114). 
Not only the NATO’s offensive air operations deterred the Serbs but also rejuvenated Bosnian Army. After US 
Congress voted to end arms embargo in favor the Bosnian Government; Bosnian Army rejuvenated and successfully 
managed a series of attacks in central Bosnia withdrawing the Serb irregulars.  Alliance of Bosnian Muslims and 
Croats, Bosnian army’s advancement into the Serbian occupied lands, magnitude of NATO’s military operations led 
the Serbian Authorites to return negotiation table.  
 
5. ‘Incomplete’ Peace Agreement of the Dayton: Sustaining short term interethnic Peace and Security. 
On 21 November 1995, The Dayton Peace Accord was signed by the participant in the ceremony. Milosevic, 
Izetbogovic and Tudjman were on the same table again. Negotiaton process was managed by Richard Holbrooke who 
had been appointed before by the Clinton Administration as the senior field negotiator. The General Framework 
Agreement: (i) Defines Bosnia –Herzegovina (BiH) as an Independent State, (ii)BiH consists of one Federation and a 
Republic; the Federation of Bosnia and Croatia; The Republica Srpsky, (iii) The Lands controlled by federation is 51 
per cent;  by RS is  49 per cent, (iv) One central government in Sarajevo, a national assembly, presidency and 
judiciary system will be in joint system, (v) President and members of Assembly will be elected under the condition of 
Democracy, (vi)Collective presidency system consists of Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian members on a rotation basis. 
According to Agreement 60.000 NATO soldiers will be deployed to prevent future possible conflicts. Implementation 
Force is going to be responsible to implement peace and security.  Later times, Implementation Forces converted into 
Stabilization Forces. According to Bieber,  DPA have brought peace, but only limited success in fundamentally 
improving interethnic relations and establishing a functioning system of joint decision- making between the three 
predominant groups of the country ( Bieber; 2002: 1). Bieber also stresses that as the Croatians and the Serbs follow 
their antogonistic politicak moves within state, the interethnic peace might disintegrate. Problems with balancing 
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competing demands of constituent states, opposition  of the Serbs against Kosova’s independence, Banja Luka’s 
declaration as capital city of RS in 2009, power-sharing system, as being a multinational Federation, having 
dysfunctional entities, lack of efficiency of International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia( ICTY)  at 
scale and scope, the premature activities of the International Community, and the lack of alternatives to Dayton will 
likely to disintegrate the Bosnian State, interethnic peace and security unless common economic interest between 
parties is to be maintained.  
6. Conclusion 
In the case of Bosnian War (1992-1995), The Peace Keeping Movements by International Participation have just 
maintained interethnic peace with slender success. The latest environment in Bosnia illustrates that interethnic peace 
sustained by the DPA is prone to disappear. Dissolving interethnic peace in the Balkans means the threat of mass 
killings and ethnic cleansing among rivals.  As conflict in Bosnia examined, it is understood that the timing and scale 
of Peacekeeping strategies subsequently set up an environment in which ethnic cleansings turned into genocide.  
Peacekeping measures in the mid of conflict is far away from securing UN “safe areas”.  NATO’s stong intervention 
and rejuvenation of Bosnian Army at the end of conflict urged the Serbian Authorities to return back to negotiation 
table mediated by R. Holbrooke. The DPA has established and stabilized the post conflict environment defining the 
new state structure with power sharing system. On the other hand Post Dayton Bosnian state in which recently 
conflicting parties are still debating on territorial issues, displaced persons, use of economic resources, and judgment 
of war fugitives. Hence, international community must contribute and facilitate initially peace progress by mediating 
unresolved issues and maintaining common interest among conflicting parties. Problems related to Post-Dayton 
Bosnian State can be isolated by maintaining common interest composing of both social and economic agendas. 
Agendas include sustaining improvement in health, education and culture, righteous judgment of fugitives, 
compensating war crimes, functionalizing open market principles, encouraging FDIs, mediating territorial disputes 
and sustaining transparency. 
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